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Internal states of bodily arousal contribute to emotional feeling states and 
behaviours. This review details the influence of interoceptive processing on emotion and 
describes how deficits in interoceptive ability may underpin aberrant emotional processes 
characteristic of clinical conditions. The representation and control of bodily physiology (e.g. 
heart rate and blood pressure) and the encoding of emotional experience and behaviour 
share neural substrates within forebrain regions coupled to ascending neuromodulatory 
systems. This functional architecture provides a basis for dynamic embodiment of emotion. 
We will approach the relationship between interoception and emotion within the interoceptive 
predictive processing framework and describe how emotional states could be the product of 
interoceptive prediction error minimization. 
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Emotions are often accompanied by bodily changes – we experience this when we 
blush with embarrassment, feel our heart beat faster and our breath go shallow when we are 
in fear. The view that emotion and body are intimately related was first formulated by William 
James (James, 1884) who claimed that peripheral autonomic changes constitute emotions. 
The sensing of autonomic changes is referred to as interoception, the afferent processing of 
signals that originate within the body. Involved in interoception are different classes and 
channels (e.g., cardiovascular, gastric) of information that are distinct with respect to their 
afferent pathway (neural, humoral) and the generation of the signal (mechanoreceptive 
organ stretching, chemoreception). These channels share neural substrates, i.e., brain 
mechanisms, in which integrative processes take place. These allow for the generation of 
representations that predict internal states, which might steer adaptive behaviour (e.g., when 
blood sugar levels drop below a specific threshold, find food). Changes in bodily states and 
their interoceptive signaling can be constitutive of emotional feelings, leading to the 
possibility that the affective style (e.g. the intensity of emotions) of a person reflects 
differences in conscious and unconscious processing of interoceptive information.  
Individual interoceptive differences manifest themselves in different psychological 
dimensions of interoception that comprise objective, subjective, and metacognitive 
measures (Canales-Johnson et al., 2015; Garfinkel, Seth, Barrett, Suzuki, & Critchley, 
2015).  Quantifications of interoceptive abilities include objective measures such as 
behavioural performance accuracy during a heartbeat detection tasks (Schandry, 1981). 
Subjective (i.e. sensibility) measures include self-reports about interoceptive proficiency, 
such as evaluations of how well internal signals can be sensed using questionnaires 
(Porges, 1993). An enhanced mismatch between subjective and objective measures of 
interoception is associated with anxiety symptomatology (Garfinkel et al., 2016). 
A way in which bodily and emotional processes merge can be found within the brain, 
where they share a similar neural architecture (Zaki, Davis, & Ochsner, 2012). Specific 
cortical regions, especially the anterior insular cortex (AIC), are activated when individuals 
focus their attention on changes in internal, bodily states, highlighting the role of AIC in the 
perception of autonomic changes (Critchley, 2004; Peyron, Laurent, & Garcia-Larrea, 2000; 
Williams et al., 2000). The insular cortex is thus of special interest to both interoception and 
emotion. In the brain, fibers from lamina 1 project into the NTS (nucleus of the solitary tract), 
parabrachial nucleus, periaqueductal gray, and other brainstem autonomic output nuclei. 
However, the ventromedial posterior nucleus of the thalamus is the main relay of 
viscerosensory information within the spinothalamic tract projecting onto insular cortex (see 
Critchley and Harrison, 2013). The insular cortex is located in the brain bilaterally 
underneath frontal and temporal lobes and is part of the cerebral cortex. It is divided into 
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posterior and anterior insular cortex, where each part has its own cellular and functional 
structure. Its cytoarchitecture changes from granular in the posterior region to agranular in 
the anterior insula. The insular cortex is bidirectionally connected to parietal, frontal and 
limbic regions (Deen, Pitskel, & Pelphrey, 2011). While the posterior regions of the insula 
are reciprocally connected with the second somatosensory cortex (SII) and receive input 
from the thalamus, conveying information such as pain, temperature and oxygen status, AIC 
is closely connected with the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC). AIC and ACC together engage 
subcortical regions such as the amygdala and orbitofrontal cortex (OFC). It has thus been 
suggested that the posterior parts of the insula support primary, objective representations of 
bodily signals, while AIC re-represents and integrates these signals with exteroceptive and 
motivational information (Seth, 2013a). AIC is also engaged in emotion elicitation tasks 
(Kober et al., 2008; Wicker et al., 2003) and neuroscientific models posit that the processing 
of visceral information in AIC supports an overlap between interoceptive and emotional 
states (Lamm & Singer, 2010). 
Appraisal theories of emotion (Schachter & Singer, 1962) add another component to 
the mix of interoception and emotion, namely that of cognitive appraisal. According to this 
view, emotional states are elicited by bodily changes and subsequent contextualization. 
Modern theories of the embodiment of emotion (Craig, 2002; Critchley, et al., 2004) adopt a 
similar approach, by also integrating findings about the shared neural underpinnings of 
interoception and emotion with the idea of contextualization. Together they highlight the role 
of bodily signals in shaping emotional experience and the role of cognitive appraisal in 
shaping the type of emotion felt. 
These theoretical and empirical advances on the interplay of emotional and 
interoceptive processes have recently been put together within the unifying perspective of 
predictive processing (Clark, 2016). Predictive processing (PP) views the brain as a 
hierarchical generator of predictions about its most likely next states. These predictions are 
then compared against actual sensory input (generating a prediction error), which either 
leads to a change of predictions in light of the new evidence (perception), or to action that 
changes brain-external circumstances (active inference). This principle not only applies to 
exteroceptive information processing, but also to predicting and controlling bodily 
interoceptive states. This can be described as interoceptive inference (Seth, 2013), which 
has also been called ‘interoceptive predictive processing’ (IPP). IPP claims that emotional 
states are brought forth in the process of minimizing interoceptive prediction error and the 
top-down (i.e., from higher to lower levels in the processing hierarchy) predictive inference of 
causes of interoceptive signals. The network of AIC and other cortical regions is thought to 
underlie this process of generating emotions via interoceptive inference (Seth, Suzuki, & 
Critchley, 2011).  
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In this chapter, we will elaborate on the IPP perspective to frame findings about the 
relationship between emotion and interoception. We will detail shared mechanisms of 
emotional and interoceptive processing, focusing on the role of the insular cortex as a 
central hub in addition to core regions such as anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) and 
amygdala. In a next step, we describe how differences in interoceptive processing can lead 
to individual differences in emotional expression, behaviour, and experience. Lastly, we 
show how impairments in interoception relate to affective psychopathology, with particular 
focus on autism spectrum conditions (ASCs), anxiety disorders, depression, and eating 
disorders (EDs). 
2. Shared Mechanisms 
The relation between emotion and interoception is reflected in their neural 
counterparts. Previous findings support the description of a joint network of interoceptive and 
emotional processing that has AIC and ACC at its center. Imaging studies show that 
emotions are mediated by a matrix of subcortical and cortical structures whose activity is 
also correlated to alterations in internal bodily states (Phan, Wager, Taylor, & Liberzon, 
2002). Specifically, ventral prefrontal, anterior cingulate and insular cortices, amygdala, 
ventral striatum and dorsal brainstem are identified as relevant structures for emotions, 
which also have been related to changes in heart rate (Critchley et al., 2005), temperature 
(Nummenmaa, Glerean, Hari, & Hietanen, 2014), and blood pressure (Critchley, Corfield, 
Chandler, Mathias, & Dolan, 2000). 
The insula and ACC play an especially important role for the joint processing of 
emotion and interoception. AIC is seen as mediating both interoceptive accuracy (i.e., how 
well individuals perceive inner states; Critchley et al. 2004) and deficits in emotion 
processing (Berthoz et al., 2002). This is in line with the claim that integration processes in 
the anterior insula allow the uncovering of internal bodily states which then inform emotional 
processing (Terasawa, Shibata, Moriguchi, & Umeda, 2013). Thus there appears to be a 
triadic relationship between activity in AIC, emotional and interoceptive processing. 
Specifically, heightened activity in the insula is associated with both interoceptive processing 
and the processing of emotional intensity (Zaki, et al., 2012), supporting the view that 
judgements of emotional intensity are informed by the sensing of internal bodily sensations. 
An instance of how interoceptive signaling influences emotion processing is how 
responses to emotional stimuli vary depending on when in the cardiac cycle they are 
presented (Critchley & Garfinkel, 2017). Fear stimuli, for example, are more easily detected 
and perceived as more intense when presented at systole when baroreceptors 
(interoceptors that encode blood vessel and cardiac chamber stretch due to pressure 
change) are active compared to presentation at diastole when baroreceptors are inactive 
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(Critchley & Garfinkel, 2015; Garfinkel & Critchley, 2016; Garfinkel et al., 2014). 
Cardiovascular arousal thus can enhance the experience of fear and anxiety. 
Another example of the interacting relationship between interoception and emotion 
can be found in the influence of inflammation on emotional states. Inflammatory processes 
can lead to ‘sickness behaviours’ like fatigue, social withdrawal and irritability (Harrison, 
2017). Interoceptive pathways to insula are involved in conveying inflammation signals, thus 
suggesting an interoceptive mechanism in the shared relation between inflammatory and 
emotional states. 
These findings show that emotional and interoceptive processing have a common 
underlying neural architecture, which comprises AIC, ACC and other functionally connected 
regions. Bodily arousal and emotional intensity are tightly correlated, which points towards 
shared mechanisms beyond the brain. 
3. Individual Differences 
People differ with respect to how intensely they experience emotions in general, and 
it is particularly interesting that this might be due to individual differences in interoceptive 
performance. It is typically assumed that a heightened ability to detect internal bodily 
changes is associated with more intensely felt emotions, a hypothesis that has been 
confirmed in several studies (Wiens, Mezzacappa, & Katkin, 2000). 
Quantifying interoceptive performance involves a variety of methods, ranging from 
questionnaires to behavioural tests that look for fluctuations in physiological signals or 
experimentally alter organ physiology. Among the most widely used methods are heartbeat 
detection tasks, where individuals either count their heartbeats silently for a given amount of 
time (Schandry, 1981) or judge whether an external signal is in or out of synch with their 
heartbeat (Katkin, Morell, Goldband, Bernstein, & Wise, 1982). In order to grasp these 
different measures, novel conceptual tools have been introduced to describe different 
psychological dimensions of interoception; viz. objective performance accuracy, subjective 
sensibility and metacognitive awareness (Garfinkel, et al., 2016).  
Interoceptive accuracy refers to the objective measure of how well people perform on 
interoceptive tasks, such as heartbeat discrimination or counting tasks. This dimension is 
dissociable from sensibility, which refers to the subjective impression of how well individuals 
think they are able to perceive internal signals. This can be measured by questionnaires 
such as the Body Perception Questionnaire (Porges, 1993). The third dimension describes 
the relationship between subjective and objective measures, that is, the metacognitive 
awareness of individuals regarding how well they performed on an interoceptive task (e.g., 
knowing they performed well when they actually performed well or knowing they performed 
poorly when they did perform poorly), such as through confidence-accuracy 
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correspondence. Thus metacognitive awareness can be conceptualized as an interoceptive 
insight measure. Deficits within these dimensions can predict emotional states and affective 
psychopathology. In line with this, individuals with higher alexithymia – a sub-clinical 
condition that is characterized by impairments in recognizing and describing one’s emotions 
(Nemiah, 1976) – showed impoverished interoceptive accuracy (Ernst et al., 2014).  
The three-level model of interoceptive dimensions was recently extended (Critchley 
& Garfinkel, 2017) to include lower levels that exhibit afferent neural trafficking and the 
preconscious impact of interoceptive signals on sensory processing (Fig.1). Good heartbeat 
perceivers, for example, experience greater arousal for emotional pictures than poor 
heartbeat perceivers and also showed greater heartbeat-evoked potentials (HEP) for 
emotional pictures (Herbert, Pollatos, & Schandry, 2007). Within brain, individual differences 
in insula activation correlate to levels of negative emotional states expressed as anxiety and 
neuroticism (Terasawa, et al., 2013). This again points into the direction of a link between 
interoceptive and emotional performance. Additionally, higher levels beyond metacognition 
are added to the model, which include executive processes like the modulation of attention 
(Critchley & Garfinkel, 2017). Individual differences could manifest themselves in the ability 
to flexibly attend to either interoceptive or exteroceptive signals or switching between 
interoceptive tasks. This in turn may be related to focusing on and consciously detecting 
one’s own emotional state. 
The ability to detect emotion and its relationship to interoceptive performance may 
also extend into the social domain and influence how accurately emotions of others are 
perceived. Empirical results on this topic are, however, conflicting, possibly due to different 
measurement methods. On the one hand, it was found that the higher the interoceptive 
accuracy, the more sensitive one is to the emotions of another person (Terasawa, 
Moriguchi, Tochizawa, & Umeda, 2014). In line with this finding is a study showing that 
people who scored high on alexithymia questionnaires showed reduced activation in insular 
cortex both when they tried to access their own emotions and when empathizing with 
another person’s pain (Bird et al., 2010; Silani et al., 2008). Another indication for a close 
relationship between interoception and empathy is a finding that shows enhanced neural 
activity during empathy in brain regions related to both interoception and empathy after 
participants completed an interoceptive performance task (Ernst, Northoff, Böker, Seifritz, & 
Grimm, 2013). The insula cortex underlies both current and predictive representations, 
which are crucial for learning processes of uncertainty and emotional states (Singer, 
Critchley, & Preuschoff, 2009). In this learning process, predictions about feeling states in 
self and others are compared to actual incoming signals and then updated depending on the 
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discrepancy between prediction and signal1. Integrative processes within the insula cortex 
support this error-based learning process in which empathic and subjective feeling states 
are generated.  
 
Figure 1 Dimensions of Interoception 
Dimensions of interoception range from the level of brain and body, to behaviour, and metacognition. 
At each dimension, individual differences manifest themselves and can have an impact on emotional 
processes and states. These dimensions are though to interact with each other, for example in the 
alignment of interoceptive accuracy and sensibility. 
                                                 
1 There might be confusion in the PP scheme about what is considered a ‘signal’ and what counts as a 
‘representation’ (thanks to our reviewer for bringing up this important issue). A helpful distinction 
could be that representations exist even at very low levels, if representations are defined as 
abstractions from the actual signal. As soon as there is a prediction about what the signal (e.g., 
mechanoreceptive organ stretching) might be, there is an abstraction from the signal itself, thus 
making it a representation (for a more detailed discussion, see Quadt, 2017, chapter 6). 
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On the other hand, Ainley and colleagues (Ainley, Maister, & Tsakiris, 2015) did not 
find any correlations between interoceptive accuracy and empathy scores on questionnaires. 
The relationship between empathy and interoceptive performance thus is still up to debate. 
In summary, these findings strongly suggest that the degree to which one is able to 
detect and attend to internal states determines how well emotions are recognized in self and 
others. These individual differences can be found along different dimensions of 
interoception, which interact with and influence emotional experience. 
 
4. Interoceptive Predictive Processing (IPP) and Emotion 
Predictive processing (PP;Clark, 2013, 2016) is ultimately a theory about how the 
brain makes sense of the world and body it is embedded in. While it has historically been 
exclusively applied to perception and action, it has recently been extended to include 
interoception and emotion (Seth et al., 2011). 
Predictive Processing 
The rationale of PP is that there are hidden causes in the world – hidden from the 
brain in the skull – that need to be inferred. All the brain can access are its own states: it can 
neither directly access the external world, nor the body it is embedded in, nor other agents. It 
thus has to solve an inverse problem, viz. how do the effects on the brain relate to causes in 
the external world (Hohwy, 2013). The solution to this problem presents itself in the form of 
inference; in order to find out about what lies behind the effects the brain receives, the 
causes must be inferred. It is proposed that this happens within a hierarchy where 
predictions about the most likely state of the level below are generated and then compared 
to actual sensory .input. While low levels predict basic sensory properties of incoming 
signals at fast timescales, higher levels predict more complex regularities at slower 
timescales (Hohwy, 2010).The crucial information, i.e., the mismatch (i.e., error) between 
prediction and signal is then conveyed via feedforward connections in order to improve the 
model. This process of updating the model is called perceptual inference and is contrasted 
against active inference (Friston, 2010). In active inference, instead of changing models, 
biological agents act so to change sensory input to make it accommodate predictions better. 
Both perceptual and active inference serve the brain’s main task: minimizing prediction error.  
One question that arises, though, is the following: How does the brain ‘decide’ which 
of these strategies to choose? This is determined by how precise the expectations and error 
signals are deemed to be. The ‘job’ of prediction errors, as we have seen, is to improve the 
generative model. However, it is important that errors are not simply taken to be ‘trustworthy’ 
(i.e. reliably informing the system about external states) and change the model or motivate 
to act. Error signals are taken into account depending on an estimation of how reliable they 
will be. If prediction errors are, for example, estimated as highly precise, they are likely to 
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change the hypothesis. That is, the impact of an error signal depends on how precise it is 
estimated to be. At the same time, the reliability of predictive models needs to factored in, 
too. Thus, “we are, in effect, estimating the uncertainty of our own representations of the 
world.” (Clark, 2015, p. 12) 
Interoceptive Predictive Processing (IPP) 
This PP scheme was recently applied to interoception (Barrett & Simmons, 2015; 
Seth, 2013b; Seth, et al., 2011). In general, interoceptive predictive processing (IPP) follows 
the same principle as inference of exteroceptive states as described above. Predictive 
models of the next most probable interoceptive signals are generated and compared to 
actual input. This mechanism serves to keep bodily states in their expected range and to 
flexibly adapt to external and internal changes. Instead of simply comparing inputs to 
homeostatic set-points and changing the internal environment accordingly, the idea is that 
the system anticipates demands that deviate from the average and thus efficiently regulates 
needs and resources. The terms ‘allostasis’ and ‘predictive regulation’ were introduced to 
conceptualize this process of optimizing regulation in a predictive manner (Sterling, 2012). 
According to the size and estimated reliability of the prediction error, prediction error can be 
minimized in several ways; namely by updating generative models;  of interoceptive states; 
by engaging hormonal, visceral, immunological and autonomic mechanisms to change 
interoceptive signals via active inference; or by actions that change external conditions 





Figure 2: Active interoceptive inference 
This figure depicts a sketch of the dynamics of active interoceptive inference. At time t1, 
predictions (‘P’) about the interoceptive state of the body are passed down via backward connections 
and compared against actual incoming interoceptive input. When there is a mismatch between 
predicted and actual body state, a prediction error (‘PE’) is generated. Note that precision of this 
ascending error signal must be attenuated, so not to change predictions and thus to inhibit autonomic 
control. At time t2, prediction errors are quashed by autonomic control. The changed interoceptive 
input is again fed forward to now inform predictions.  
 
The  engagement of autonomic, hormonal, visceral, and immunological mechanisms 
serves to maintain homeostasis or to enable allostasis. 2   Throughout the process of 
monitoring its own states, the system keeps updating and changing its states, in order to 
keep them in an expected range. Active interoceptive inference describes the process of 
adjusting how internal systems use autonomic, immunological and metabolic resources 
                                                 
2 The difference between homeostasis and allostasis is that the former refers to the maintenance of 
specific and rather rigid set-points, while the latter describes a highly flexible demand-regulated 
change of states. Rather than committing to homeostatic set-points (e.g., keeping blood pressure 
around a specific value), allostasis anticipates the changing needs of the system and adjusts bodily 
states accordingly (e.g., adjusting blood pressure relative to moment-by-moment demands). For a 
much more detailed discussion, see Sterling, 2012.  
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depending on the difference (prediction error) between predicted (demanded) and actual 
signal (Barrett & Simmons, 2015).  
Throughout the process of adjusting interoceptive predictions and bodily states, 
emotional contents may arise (Barrett, 2017; Seth, 2013a). Visceromotor cortices engender 
autonomic, hormonal and immunological predictions which underlie the system’s allostatic 
responses. These predictions are not only forwarded to the body where they cause internal 
changes, they are also sent to the insula, termed the ‘primary interoceptive cortex’ (Barrett & 
Simmons, 2015). Here these predictions are compared to afferent signals resulting from 
visceral, muscular and skin changes. The ensuing error signal is propagated back up to 
visceromotor regions where the prediction originated. Once interoceptive input is accounted 
for, that is, once it is sufficiently explained by predictive models, emotional content arises 
(Barrett, 2017).  
This model of emotions draws on the James-Lange theory, which assumes that 
emotional experiences are first and foremost constituted by the monitoring of interoceptive 
states. However, one shortcoming of this theory, which has been adopted and refined widely 
(e.g. the somatic marker hypothesis, (Damasio, 1996), is that it (at least implicitly) asserts a 
one-to-one mapping of emotional effect and interoceptive cause (Clark, 2016). This means 
that it is assumed that there is one change in interoception (that can probably be marked, 
hence ‘somatic marker hypothesis’) that leads to the perceived emotion. However, it is more 
likely that there are several possible causes that bring forth an emotion. Viewing this basic 
idea within an IPP perspective, though, promises to alleviate this problem of former theories 
in the sense that the most probable of a variety of likely reasons is actively inferred.  
IPP furthermore describes a strong relation between exteroceptive, proprioceptive, 
and interoceptive processes in that it assumes that information from all three channels is 
integrated at hierarchically higher levels. It is this “context-reflecting amalgam” (Clark, 2016) 
that then presents itself as an experienced emotion. Emotions, in this view, integrate low-
level uni-modal information (i.e., interoceptive, exteroceptive, or proprioceptive information) 
with higher-level predictions of probable causes. In other words, emotions occur in the 
process of integrating information from several sources in order to form interoceptive 
predictions. These predictions, which then contain contextual information from 
exteroception, interoception, and proprioception are compared to actual incoming signals. 
Emotional states arise throughout this process. Note that this implies an intimate, and likely 
interacting relation between interoceptive and exteroceptive processing. For one, both 
external and internal events shape emotional response. Additionally, when external events 




One important consequence of adopting such a view is that it updates appraisal or 
two-factor theories of emotional experience (Schachter & Singer, 1962). These theories 
suggest that emotions have two components: a bodily and a cognitive one. The latter is 
needed to appraise the former and thus leaves the emotion subjectively colored. However, 
IPP now claims that subjective emotional states simply occur in virtue of the single 
mechanism just described. Multimodal higher-level top-down predictions entail contextual 
information which frame how interoceptive signals are interpreted and transformed into 
emotions. This means that in the process of interoceptive predictive processing, cognitive 
appraisal is already ‘built in’ and shapes emotional experience.  
The role of the insular cortex, especially the AIC, undoubtedly plays a key role in this 
coordinating process. Seth (2013) claims that emotional responses crucially rely on 
predictions of causes of interoceptive input that are continually updated. These predictions 
are generated, compared to actual input and then updated within a salience network that 
consists of insular cortex, ACC and several other functional connections to the brainstem.  
IPP is a promising theory to frame the relationship between emotion and 
interoception because it proposes a single principle– prediction error minimization – to 
underlie the generation of emotional and bodily states. It also provides novel ways to look at 
psychopathology, which we will detail in the next section. 
5. Clinical Implications 
Many psychiatric conditions come with emotion impairments – ranging from prevalent 
negative affect in depression to feelings of high alert and arousal in anxiety. A clear example 
of how emotion and interoception are related in psychopathology is the connection between 
interoceptive performance and occurrence of alexithymia. It has been proposed that where 
there is alexithymia, there is poor interoceptive accuracy (Murphy, Brewer, Catmur, & Bird, 
2016). Indeed, many clinical conditions come with both alexithymia and impairments in 
interoceptive processing. Here, we will focus on autism spectrum conditions (ASCs), anxiety 
disorders, depression and eating disorders (EDs), all of which show an interesting relation 
between emotional and interoceptive processing. 
Autism Spectrum Conditions 
Autism spectrum conditions are characterized as neurodevelopmental lifelong 
conditions that come with impairments in social cognition and emotion processing, as well as 
restrictions in interest and activities and stereotyped patterns of behaviour (Frith, 2014). 
ASCs express high rates of alexithymia (Bird, et al., 2010), which indicates difficulties in 
processing and detecting own emotional states. This impairment extends into the social 
realm where the detection of emotions in others can be exacerbated.  
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A predictive processing perspective has been used to explain several aspects of the 
symptomology of ASCs, including unusual perception and sensation (Pellicano & Burr, 
2012) and impairments in social cognition (Palmer, Seth, & Hohwy, 2015). Aiming at an 
overarching predictive processing account of autism, it was claimed that sensory processing 
in individuals with ASCs is characterized by an unusually high weighting of sensory 
prediction errors (Palmer, Lawson, & Hohwy, 2017). 
An aberrant oxytocin system in early infancy may play a role in the development of autistic 
traits (Quattrocki & Friston, 2014). The neuromodulatory effects of oxytocin perform a major 
part in the processing of interoceptive information and their association with exteroceptive 
stimuli, and may also be involved in the neuromodulations that are necessary to elicit 
emotions. The functional anatomy of oxytocin is situated in the brain in such a way that it is 
involved in interoceptive paths that also mediate emotions. Oxytocin is thought to have  an 
important role in the modulation of associative learning between interoceptive and 
exteroceptive cues. To learn emotional affordances (e.g., caregiver means warmth and 
comfort) during infancy, associations between exteroceptive cues (touch) and interoceptive 
signals (warmth) need to be established. Neuromodulatory mechanisms are involved in 
making these associations. For example, the interoceptive change of body temperature is 
associated with the bodily presence of a caregiver due to neuromodulatory mechanisms that 
underlie the establishment of this association. This is thought to be done via selective 
augmentation and attenuation of interoceptive prediction errors, likely mediated by oxytocin. 
If these mechanisms go awry, however, the context-sensitive adjustment of prediction errors 
is disrupted, resulting in a disturbance of the necessary mechanisms to acquire generative 
models for interoceptive inference which target the emotional states of self and other. In 
other words, the failure to associate the interoceptive consequence (warmth and comfort) 
with the exteroceptive cause (caregiver) may lead to an incorrect attribution of agency in 
prosocial actions. Impaired interoceptive inference, following this logic, could thus lead to 
difficulty in recognizing emotions in self and others. The failure to modulate precision of 
interoceptive prediction error may thus result in hypersensitivity to interoceptive cues 
(“autonomic hypersensitivity”). This is because when interoceptive signals are always 
weighted as precise, they will have an increased propensity to be propagated back up the 
hierarchy, and consequently, have the power to change predictions. This, in turn, could lead 
to difficulties in both emotional and interoceptive processing. 
Viewing autism as a consequence of an abnormal neuromodulatory system 
(including oxytocin) provides an interesting perspective on well-known symptoms like 
emotional echopraxia (which can be interpreted as interoceptive hypersensitivity) and the 
tendency to not engage with exteroceptive cues in social settings. This explanation points to 
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aberrant precision control in brain systems that mediate interoceptive inference, such as 
anterior insular and cingulate cortex (Seth & Friston, 2016). 
On a neural level, autism studies report altered activity in regions that underlie 
emotion processing, as well as impoverished functional connectivity in regions important to 
both interoception and emotion. Ebisch and colleagues (Ebisch et al., 2011) quantified 
aberrant functional connectivity between posterior insula and somatosensory cortices, as 
well as between anterior insula and amygdala. These regions are hubs for interoception and 
emotion (Critchley, Mathias, & Dolan, 2002), suggesting not only a link between the two in 
healthy individuals, but also in individuals with ASCs. Based on this evidence, it was shown 
that impairments in interoceptive processing are related to aberrant emotional processing in 
ASCs (Garfinkel, et al., 2016). This appears to confirm theories of emotion which state that 
the detection of internal signals informs emotional experience, since it shows that when 
detection is disrupted, emotional impairments follow. Another indication of a  relationship 
between aberrant interoception, emotion and ASCs is that these conditions often co-occur 
with heightened alexithymia. Interestingly it was shown, however, that levels of alexithymia 
and not ASC are predictive of low interoceptive accuracy (Shah, Hall, Catmur, & Bird, 2016). 
Thus poor interoceptive accuracy may serve as a general feature of alexithymia, as well as 
underscore alexithymic traits in individuals with ASCs.  
A discrepancy between levels of interoception, i.e., enhanced interoceptive sensibility 
and low interoceptive accuracy, is predictive of anxiety symptomology. This discrepancy was 
termed ‘interoceptive trait prediction error’ (ITPE) and was found to be enhanced in 
individuals with ASCs (Garfinkel et al., 2016). This finding is in line with the proposal that the 
development of anxiety is due to both noisy interoceptive input and noisily amplified self-
referential interoceptive belief states (Paulus & Stein, 2010). Viewing the relation between 
anxiety and autism in terms of ITPE is based on the fine grained distinction of psychological 
dimensions of interoception. Where previous findings suggest that there is heightened 
sensitivity to bodily signals in autism, the differentiation between interoceptive sensibility and 
accuracy helps identify how interoceptive processing is altered autism.  
The accounts of autism described here assign an important role of prediction error 
processing to symptoms of ASC. However, there are crucial differences between the types 
of prediction errors mentioned. While in general IPP, prediction errors refer to error signals 
occurring on a moment-to-moment basis in interoceptive processing, ITPE describes a 
relationship between subjective and objective traits. They thus characterize relevant error 




Taken together, these results suggest that alignment and misalignment of 
interoceptive dimensions are fundamental to affective symptoms in autism, and – as will be 
detailed in following sections – other clinical conditions.  
Anxiety Disorders 
The misalignment of interoceptive dimensions may be especially important for the 
development of anxiety disorders (ADs). The misattribution of bodily sensations is a factor 
underlying the development of panic and related anxiety symptoms (Clark et al., 1997). The 
basis for misinterpreted bodily signals forms a heightened tendency to detect internal 
physiological changes. Indeed, several studies showed that higher interoceptive accuracy is 
related to higher anxiety traits (Domschke, Stevens, Pfleiderer, & Gerlach, 2010). 
In a model of anxiety that focuses on the role of the insula in the processing of bodily 
signals, the ability to detect sub-threshold interoceptive signals is identified as one major 
mechanism in the expression of anxiety (Paulus & Stein, 2006, 2010). These signals are 
then amplified and associated with potential aversive outcomes, thus forming the basis for 
anxious thought. Individuals with high anxiety traits are thought to be particularly sensitive to 
changes in interoceptive state when they anticipate ensuing aversive events. Belief-based 
thought with the tendency to focus on potential negative outcomes then strongly modifies the 
emotional valence of amplified bodily signals and leads to anxiety symptoms.  
From an IPP perspective, it is likely that anxiety symptoms stem from abnormal 
precision weighting processes. In line with previous theories, aberrantly large interoceptive 
prediction errors lead to heightened anxiety. Whereas in healthy individuals these errors get 
attenuated, this mechanism might fail in anxious individuals, causing an abnormally high 
sensitivity to afferent interoceptive signals. In other words, bodily signals are weighted high 
much more often in anxious than healthy individuals. This means that these signals are 
more likely to be propagated back up the hierarchy and update predictions at higher levels. 
Where interoceptive input is usually attenuated and does not reach awareness, this 
mechanism might be impaired in anxiety, leading to a hypersensitivity to interoceptive 
signals. This is then also reflected in higher interoceptive accuracy, where bodily signals are 
more readily detected and available to conscious perception.  
Depression 
Major depressive disorder (MDD) is marked by a range of somatic and affective 
symptoms, including loss of appetite, sleep disorders, aches and pains, changes in libido, 
loss of energy, pervasive negative affect and intense feelings of loneliness and 
hopelessness (Tylee & Gandhi, 2005). Somatic symptoms are universal cross-culturally 
(Kirmayer, 2001) and associated with disruptions in physiological regulatory processes, 
including hypoactivity of the autonomic nervous system (Dawson, Schell, & Catania, 1977). 
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Over the past decade, there has been growing recognition that somatic changes may drive 
alterations in emotion and cognition (Dunn, Dalgleish, Ogilvie, & Lawrence, 2007; Pollatos, 
Traut‐Mattausch, & Schandry, 2009). The role of interoception in low mood and clinical 
depression has been investigated in a number of studies; interoceptive accuracy is reduced 
in low to moderate, but not severe depression (Dunn, et al., 2007). A negative correlation 
between heartbeat perception and depressive symptoms are reported (Pollatos, et al., 
2009), where individuals with reduced interoceptive accuracy may experience emotions less 
intensely. These emotional impairments will impact social processes, as is often observed in 
MDD. 
There is frequent co-morbidity of depression and anxiety, possibly confounding 
interpretations. One subsequent study chose depressed subjects with no co-morbid anxiety 
disorder (Furman, Waugh, Bhattacharjee, Thompson, & Gotlib, 2013). An association 
between interoceptive accuracy and positive affect intensity was observed. Moreover worse 
performance was related to less affect intensity ratings in individuals with MDD, but not 
controls. The reduced autonomic reactivity to positive stimuli in depression (Bylsma, Morris, 
& Rottenberg, 2008), and the association between depressive symptoms and decreased 
responses to positive stimuli (Sloan & Sandt, 2010), indicate an aberrant interoceptive 
mechanism for positive reinforcement. In other words, physiological disruption in depression 
limits the intensity of interoceptive input. This in turn results in attenuated affective reactions 
to positive information. 
Depression was recently framed in the PP framework and described as a disorder of 
predictive mechanisms that steer allostasis, i.e., the ability to flexibly adapt to changing 
physiologically internal and external environments (Barrett, Quigley, & Hamilton, 2016). 
Affective feelings can inform the system about the state of bodily energy conditions, whereby 
the inefficient regulation of energy is coupled to affective, motor, autonomic and metabolic 
dysregulations. In depression, the brain’s internal model is negatively affected by this 
dysregulation. The brain is described as ‘locked in’ in the sense that there is an insensitivity 
to interoceptive prediction errors which – coupled with energy dysregulation that is related to 
negative affect – leads to depression. In more detail, this means that when interoceptive 
prediction errors (i.e., bodily signals) are not used to update predictions, these predictions 
may result in inefficient energy regulation. This inefficiency could be related to negative 
affect, and the tendency to disengage in physical and mental activity. Pervasive negative 
affect, in turn, could lead to the generation of more and more negative internal models, 
resulting in both predictions and prediction errors to show a bias towards the negative and 
unpleasant.  
Furthermore, peripheral endocrine immunological changes that accompany the onset 
of a depressive episode can perturb precision of interoceptive afferents (Seth & Friston, 
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2016). The attenuation of precision of ascending interoceptive signals, and greater reliance 
on interoceptive predictions, lead to dyshomeostasis. This process could engender a 
positive feedback loop in which higher reliance on predictions leads to larger and nosier 
prediction errors, which in turn increases the reliance on the now dysfunctional predictions. 
Since interoceptive predictions include ‘homeostatic set-points’, dysfunctional prediction will 
result in dysregulated homeostasis, which may trigger sickness behaviour and fatigue, 
marking the onset of depression.  
Taken together these findings suggest that dysfunctions in interoception and 
autonomic regulation are strongly related to both somatic and emotional symptoms of 
depression. PP models of depression exhibit a strong connection between 
allostasis/homeostasis and the resulting dysbalance of affective processing.  
Eating Disorders 
Both interoceptive and emotional processing appear impaired in eating disorders. 
Alexithymia often co-occurs with EDs, indicating a generally impaired recognition of own 
emotions. This extends into the social realm where it was found that emotion recognition in 
others is diminished in patients with eating disorders (Harrison, Sullivan, Tchanturia, & 
Treasure, 2009). Emotion recognition performance, however, was predicted by alexithymia 
scores rather than eating disorder symptomology (Brewer, Cook, Cardi, Treasure, & Bird, 
2015). What still stands out, though, is the high co-occurrence of alexithymia and EDs, 
suggesting that emotional processing is indeed impaired in eating disorders. 
When investigated directly, there appears to be a three-way relation between 
interoceptive performance, emotional intensity and symptomology of eating disorders. So 
far, interoceptive abilities in EDs were tested by the Eating Disorder Inventory (EDI; Garner, 
Olmstead & Polivy, 1983), in which the ability to discriminate sensations of hunger and 
satiety and to respond to emotional states (“interoceptive awareness”) 3  was in focus. 
Interoceptive awareness, as measured by the EDI, was impaired in patients with eating 
disorders, where this is characterized as a low certainty in emotion recognition related to 
hunger and satiety (Fassino, Pierò, Gramaglia, & Abbate-Daga, 2004).  
When using the heartbeat counting task (Schandry, 1981) to quantify interoceptive 
accuracy, decreased measures were found in patients with eating disorders compared to 
healthy controls (Pollatos et al., 2008). This shows that interoceptive ability is impaired in 
general and not just with respect to hunger and satiety, as measured by the EDI.  
                                                 
3 Note how the term “interoceptive awareness” here relates to the specific measure of discrimination 
of sensations and response to emotional states and is different from how we use the term in previous 
sections as a measure of the relationship between objective and subjective scores. 
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Together with findings that show altered autonomic functioning in eating disorders 
(Murialdo et al., 2007) which could lead to altered bodily feedback, this suggests that 
individuals with EDs experience emotions less intensely. Evidence in favor of this claim 
comes again from studies linking alexithymia to eating disorders (Berthoz, Perdereau, 
Godart, Corcos, & Haviland, 2007) and showing diminished affect in patients (de Zwaan, 
Biener, Bach, Wiesnagrotzki, & Stacher, 1996).  
Eating disorders could be a result of aberrant precision weighting when viewed from 
an IPP perspective (Seth, 2015). In PP, only prediction errors that are deemed ‘reliable’ will 
be propagated back up the hierarchy and update predictions. This means that in healthy 
individuals, interoceptive prediction errors related to blood sugar levels are generally 
weighted high in order to update predictions and lead to the sensation of hunger when the 
levels drop below a specific threshold. The desired, predicted bodily state thus is different 
from the actual state, which leads to the generation of interoceptive prediction errors. These  
in turn are forwarded to higher-level, multimodal models. Such models generate predictions 
of temporal sequences of exteroceptive and interoceptive inputs which are propagated down 
the hierarchy. The ensuing prediction errors can then be resolved by either autonomic 
control, where fat stores are metabolized, or by engaging active movements to seek food 
resources. It is hypothesized that dysfunctions in precision weighting, which steers this 
process, may help understanding EDs. If, for example, it is constantly assumed that blood 
sugar will be low (i.e., high-level predictions of low blood sugar become aberrantly strong), 
behaviour to find food may not pursue.  
Taken together, these findings suggest that problems in the discrimination of 
sensations like hunger and satiety, which are deemed at the core of the onset and 
maintenance of eating disorders, are mediated by a more general inability to regulate and 
describe emotions. This in turn can be traced back to impairments in interoceptive ability, 
showing a link between interoception and emotion in eating disorders. 
6. Conclusion 
Links between interoception and emotion can be found in the relationship between 
interoceptive performance and experience of emotional intensity, the ability to recognize 
one’s own emotions (as measured in alexithymia scores) and interoceptive accuracy, and 
emotion and interoception in psychopathology.  
The framework of IPP gives us a means to put these findings together in terms of 
interoceptive inference and integration of multimodal information to generate interoceptive 
predictions. Aberrant precision weighting may be involved in psychopathology, as was 
hypothesized for depression and eating disorders. 
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Together, experimental and clinical findings support the proposal that interoception, 
including individual differences in interoceptive processing, guides the experience and 
expression of emotions. Altered interoceptive pathways may account for aberrant emotional 
processing in psychopathological disorders. These observations provide insights into 
potential body-centered therapies and pharmacological targets for novel interventions for 
clinical disorders of emotion. Where interoceptive dimensions diverge, leading to 
psychopathological symptoms like anxiety, training interoceptive accuracy could lead to a 
reduction in these symptoms. Thus insight into specific interoceptive deficits may offer a 
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